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Abstract
Cryptographic hash functions are a vital part of our current computer sys-
tems. They are a core component of digital signatures, message authentica-
tion codes, file checksums, and many other protocols and security schemes.
Recent attacks against well-established hash functions have led NIST to start
an international competition to develop a new hashing standard to be named
SHA-3.
In this thesis, we provide cryptanalysis of some of the SHA-3 candidates.
We do this using a new cryptanalytical technique introduced a few months
ago called cube attacks. In addition to summarizing the technique, we build
on it by providing a framework for estimating its potential effectiveness for
cases too computationally expensive to test. We then show that cube at-
tacks can not only be applied to keyed cryptosystems but also to hash func-
tions by way of a partial preimage attack. We successfully apply this attack
to reduced-round variants of the ESSENCE and Keccak SHA-3 candidates
and provide a detailed analysis of how and why the cube attacks succeeded.
We also discuss the limits of theoretically extending these attacks to higher
rounds. Finally, we provide some preliminary results of applying cube attacks
to other SHA-3 candidates.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Problem
Cryptographic hash functions are a vital part of our current computer sys-
tems. They are a core component of digital signatures, message authentica-
tion codes, file checksums, and many other protocols and security schemes.
Because of this, their cryptographic strength is paramount to the continuance
of computer security as we know it.
Unfortunately, that strength has recently been weakened. In 2005 Wang
et. al. released details on how to break the widely-used MD5 hash function
by finding colliding messages [40]. This was followed by an attack against
the SHA-1 hash function, which while not producing a practical break did
significantly reduce the complexity of finding one [39]. With both MD5 and
SHA-1—the two most widely-used hash functions—weakened by successful
attacks, it became vital to provide more secure hash functions in order to
protect the continuation of effective cryptography in computer security.
To this end, the National Institute of Standards and Technology an-
nounced a cryptographic hash algorithm competition to produce a new hash
family which they would standardize as SHA-3 [26]. The purpose of this
competition is to provide a hash function which has undergone extensive
scientific and public review to verify its strength and effectiveness. The com-
petition was announced on November 2, 2007 [27] and is scheduled to choose
a final winner in 2012 [25].
The selection of a winner will involve extensive public review of the can-
didates. While NIST will be forming an internal committee to review the
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hash functions, detailed cryptanalysis and comments from the public will be
a vital part of their review.
1.2 Our Contributions
We first provide a detailed history of the events that led up to the SHA-3
hash function competition. We then describe a new type of cryptanalytical
attack devised by Itai Dinur and Adi Shamir called a cube attack. We build
on Dinur and Shamir’s description of cube attacks by describing a way to
analyze a cryptographic function to estimate the maximum difficulty of a
cube attack even if that difficulty is so high that it would not be practical to
actually try the attack.
Finally, we describe successful, practical cube attacks against reduced-
round versions of the SHA-3 candidates ESSENCE and Keccak. We provide
the cubes used to reproduce these attacks and an analysis of the ESSENCE
and Keccak round functions with the goal of explaining why the attacks were
successful and how far they could be theoretically extended. We also briefly
describe our results from applying cube attacks to reduced-round variants of
several other SHA-3 candidates which proved resistant.
1.3 Overview
In Chapter 2 we provide basic cryptographic background knowledge neces-
sary this thesis depends on. In Chapter 3 we describe the history of events
leading up to the NIST SHA-3 competition. Cube attacks are introduced in
Chapter 4 and our method for estimating the complexity of a cube attack
is described in Chapter 5. In Chapter 6 we describe various cube attacks
against reduced variants of SHA-3 candidates, specifically successful attacks
against reduced variants of ESSENCE and Keccak. SHA-3 candidates that
proved resistant to attack are listed in Section 6.3. We describe work related
to cube attacks and hash functions in Chapter 7. Finally, in Chapter 8 we
give some concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Throughout this document we use the following notation:
• Numbers are presumed to be decimal unless stated otherwise. If a
number is expressed in a different base, the number will be given with
the base in a subscript and most significant digits on the left. For
example, 101101012 is the binary form of the decimal number 181.
• ¬X is bitwise negation of X.
• X ∧ Y is the bitwise AND of X and Y .
• X ∨ Y is the bitwise OR of X and Y .
• X ⊕ Y is the bitwise exclusive OR of X and Y .
• X  i is X shifted i bits to the left and padded with 0’s on the right.
If X is a fixed width integer, then as many as i of the most significant
bits may be lost.
• X  i is X shifted i bits to the right and padded with 0’s on the left.
If X is a fixed width integer, then the i least significant bits will be
lost.
• X ≪ i is X rotated i bits to the left.
• X ≫ i is X rotated i bits to the right.
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• X||Y is the concatenation of X and Y .
2.2 Hash Functions
A hash function1 is a cryptographic primitive that compresses an arbitrary
length input into a fixed length output called a message digest. It does this
in such a way that the output is effectively unique2 with regard to the input,
and the process cannot be reversed to yield the input from the output.
In more specific mathematical terms, a hash function can be defined as:
h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}m
where m is the fixed length of the hash function h in bits [32].
The output of h must be effectively unique. This means that a computa-
tion that produces an x and x′ such that x 6= x′ and h(x) = h(x′) must take
at least 2m/2 hash operations, which is approximately the number of hash
operations in which an x and x′ could be found by random search alone3
[32].
The hash function h must also be irreversible (also known as being “one-
way”). This means that given a message digest y such that y = h(x), com-
puting x from y should require no less than the work equivalent to 2m hash
operations, which is the number of hash operations necessary to find x by
exhaustive guessing.
2.2.1 Hash function security problems
In order to maintain these properties and be considered cryptographically
secure, a hash function must not be susceptible to the following attacks [36]:
Preimage Given a hash function h and a hash value y, find message value
x such that h(x) = y.
1For the purposes of this discussion, when we say “hash function” we will be referring
to an unkeyed, one-way hash function.
2By “effectively unique” we mean that while other inputs which would produce the
same output may exist, the likelihood of finding such an input is so negligible that it is
not pragmatically worth considering.
3This is known as a “birthday attack.” For more information on the math that results
in these probabilities, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Birthday_attack or Section
7.4 of [32].
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Second-Preimage Given a hash function h and a message value x, find
another message value x′ such that x 6= x′ and h(x) = h(x′).
Collision Given a hash function h, find two message values x and x′ such
that x 6= x′ but h(x) = h(x′).
Length Extension Given a hash function h, a hash value h(x), and the
message length |x|, find an x′ such that h(x||x′) can be calculated.
In addition to these, an ideal hash function must also be partial preimage
resistant [23, §9.2.6]:
Partial Preimage Resistance For some hash function h, given a hash
value y = h(x) it should be just as hard to recover a substring of x from y
as to recover all of x. Furthermore, if all but t bits of x are known, it should
still take on average 2t−1 hash operations to find these bits.
In this thesis, we will perform partial preimage attacks in the following
manner: Given a hash function h and a function g(x) = h(y||x) where y is
secret but g is available to the attacker, find y.
2.2.2 Merkle-Damg˚ard chaining scheme
Many hash functions—including MD5 and SHA-1—are constructed using the
Merkle-Damg˚ard chaining scheme. In this scheme, a hash function h is built
up from a compression function f such that if f is collision resistant, then h
is as well [36].
This is done as follows. Given a compression function f : {0, 1}m ×
{0, 1}t → {0, 1}m for m, t ≥ 1 and an input x of length n, split x into t
size blocks such that x = x1||x2||x3|| · · · ||xk. If the last block xk is less
than t bits in length, right pad it with 0’s.4 Then append a final block xk+1
which contains the right-justified binary representation of n. The compres-
sion function f is then used to chain the input blocks together by computing
4Some hashes which claim to be using a Merkle-Damg˚ard chaining scheme will append
a ‘1’-bit to the message before the 0-padding. Strictly speaking, this is not a pure Merkle-
Damg˚ard chaining scheme but instead is a different construction similar to that used in
SHA-1 [28]. However, this variation is common enough that it deserves mention.
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Hi = f(Hi−1, xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ k + 1. The initial value H0 is generally a special
constant which is part of the hash function’s definition. The hash function re-
sult for input x can now be iteratively defined as h(x) = Hk+1 = f(Hk, xk+1).
In this way, the hash function h has been built from the compression function
f via the Merkle-Damg˚ard chaining scheme [23]. A visual representation of
the Merkle-Damg˚ard chaining scheme is given in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Merkle-Damg˚ard construction [20].
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Chapter 3
History of the NIST SHA-3
Competition
Cryptographic hash functions are an integral component of the grand scheme
of cryptography. In the past few decades, much focus has been given to
block cipher design, with hash functions somewhat relegated to the sidelines.
However, events in the past few years have thrown hash functions into the
focus of the international cryptographic community. To understand the work
presented in this thesis in context, it is necessary to review these events.
3.1 The Breaking of MD5 and Weakening of
SHA-1
MD5 is a hash function devised by Ron Rivest and published in 1992 [30],
eventually becoming one of the most widely used hash functions in existence.
While weaknesses were found in its compression function in 1996 [15], the
full MD5 hash function remained secure. The discovery of these weaknesses
did however provoke the creation of a more secure, yet very similar, hash
called SHA-1.
3.1.1 Wang et. al.’s attack and improvements
In 2004, a group of Chinese researchers led by Xiaoyun Wang broke MD5 [40].
Through a slight variation on classical differential cryptanalysis they were
able to construct colliding two-block message inputs. This was accomplished
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by constructing two connected differential paths of all 64 rounds of MD5
for the two message block input. Using this technique, Wang’s team was
able to generate collisions for MD5 in about one hour on an IBM P690
supercomputer. This attack was also able to find collisions in HAVAL-128,
MD4, RIPEMD, and SHA-0 [37, 38, 41].
The announcement of this attack generated quite a stir in the crypto-
graphic community. About one year after Wang’s attack was published in
2005, numerous improvements on the attack had been made by the crypto-
graphic community. In March 2006, Black et. al. published a paper which
combined the existing improvements on the attack such that colliding two-
block message pairs could be generated in an average of 11 minutes on com-
modity PC hardware [10]. Around the same time, Vastimil Klima released a
paper in which he introduced a new technique he called “tunneling” which
reduced the search time necessary to find an MD5 collision to about 31 sec-
onds on commodity hardware [17]. In June 2007, M.M.J. Stevens published
his Master’s thesis in which he detailed how to generate collisions in about
6 seconds on commodity hardware [34]. In his thesis, he also detailed an
algorithm for automatically generating new differential paths for MD5 and
an algorithm for generating chosen-prefix collisions for MD5.
While one segment of the cryptographic community was improving the
speed of the MD5 attack, others were devising ways of applying it to demon-
strate new weaknesses in computer security infrastructure. In a paper enti-
tled “MD5 To Be Considered Harmful Someday” [16], Dan Kaminsky out-
lined methods to attack system auditing software (such as Tripwire), in-
trusion detection systems, Digital Rights Management systems, and peer-
to-peer file sharing networks using only the original example collisions that
Wang et. al. first published. These attacks utilized the properties of MD5’s
Merkle-Damg˚ard chaining structure which allows an arbitrary set of blocks
to be appended to each input in the collision pair while still maintaining the
collision.
Another important set of applied attacks was created by Lenstra, Wang,
and de Weger who devised a method to generate X.509 certificates with
colliding RSA signatures by constructing the certificates’ public keys using
MD5 collisions [19, 18]. Stevens extended this attack using his chosen-prefix
collisions to generate colliding X.509 certificates with different identities [34].
In December 2008, a team including Stevens and Lenstra used these X.509
attacks to create forged SSL certificates that were authentically signed by
a trusted Certificate Authority [33, 35]. Their work involved improvements
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on the existing cryptographic attack, employed some very clever engineering,
and targeted design flaws in automatic Certificate Authorities.
By the end of 2008, MD5 had been so severely broken, both theoretically
and practically, that it was unquestionably no longer fit for use. Unfor-
tunately, there are still a wide variety of applications and protocols which
use MD5, and this can lead to dangerous, real-world attacks like the X.509
certificate attack just mentioned.
3.1.2 Extension to SHA-1
With MD5 broken, SHA-1 [28] was the next hash function to turn to. SHA-
1 was similar to MD5 but had some features to its design which made it
appear more secure. In 1996, Hans Dobbertin found a collision for the MD5
compression function [15]. While this did not compromise the security of the
full MD5 hash function, it was enough for some people to begin using SHA-1
instead of MD5. As a result, when MD5 was broken, the infrastructure to
switch to SHA-1 was already in place, and in fact a number of systems that
were already using SHA-1 were not adversely affected.
It turned out though that SHA-1 was susceptible to the same attack
used against MD5, albeit to a lesser degree. Wang, Yin, and Yu detailed an
attack that could find collisions in full 80-round SHA-1 using less than 269
hash compressions, which is less than the 280 of a brute force attack [39].
This constituted a theoretical break of SHA-1 but was still a ways from a
practical break that could be executed with modern hardware. De Cannie`re
and Rechberger advanced this by devising an algorithm to find collisions
for 64-round SHA-1 in 235 hash compressions on average and generated an
example collision [13]. They then extended this to 70-round SHA-1 in 244
hash compressions [12]. These developments appeared to bring an attack
against the full 80-round SHA-1 within reach. At the time of this writing, a
massive joint computing effort is taking place to find the first SHA-1 collision
[1]. Even more promising though is a recent result presented at the rump
session of EuroCrypt 2009 [11], in which the presenters gave a complete
differential path which yielded an attack of complexity 252 on the full SHA-
1, a dramatic improvement from the previous best result.
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3.2 NIST’s Call for Hash Function Designs
Since their creation, MD5 and SHA-1 had become incredibly widely used hash
functions, arguably the most widely used within the public domain. With
the break of MD5 and a theoretical break of SHA-1 that was teetering on the
edge of producing a full collision, it quickly became clear that replacements
must be found. The SHA-2 family of hashes had been released in 2001 by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [29], but their
design was based on principles similar to those used in MD5 and SHA-1. This
raised concerns that they may eventually be found vulnerable to the same
class of attacks that had been used against MD5 and SHA-1. If this happens,
it would have catastrophic effects for digital signatures, which in turn would
compromise a large number of critically important security protocols relied
on by the public.
3.2.1 SHA-3 competition announcement
In response to the attack against SHA-1, the National Institute of Stan-
dards and Technology held a conference to assess the remaining strength of
its approved hash functions [25]. At this conference, it was concluded that
while the approved hash functions were still secure for the moment, it was
necessary to choose a new hash function which would provide a long-term
replacement for SHA-1. While there are a number of more recently devel-
oped hash functions which could be used to replace MD5 and SHA-1, they
each have their strengths and weaknesses. Since it is valuable for the sake
of standardization to have a single hash function which is known to be se-
cure and widely accepted, and to determine which of these hash functions is
superior to the others, NIST called for a competition to determine a new,
standardized hash function.
In an announcement in the Federal Register, NIST wrote [27]:
NIST has decided that it is prudent to develop a new hash al-
gorithm to augment and revise FIPS 180-2 [the SHA-2 family of
hashes]. The new hash algorithm will be referred to as “SHA-3”,
and will be developed through a public competition, much like
the development of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
The formal announcement listed a set of submission criteria for candidate
hash functions which included the following [27]:
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1. The hash function should be publicly disclosed and free of royalties and
intellectual property encumbrances.
2. The hash function should be implementable on a wide range of hard-
ware and software platforms.
3. The hash function should be able to produce digest sizes of 224, 256,
384, and 512 bits with a maximum message length of 264 − 1 bits.
Each accepted hash function was then to be evaluated on the following
criteria [27]:
Security It should be resistant to specific known attacks (e.g., differential
cryptanalysis) and resistant to solutions for the security problems mentioned
in section 2.2.1. Additionally, it should have special security properties spe-
cific to certain applications such as HMACs and PRNGs.
Cost It should be computationally efficient and should consume a minimal
amount of memory.
Algorithm and Implementation Characteristics It should be flexible
and simple.
The deadline for submitting hash functions was October 31, 2008. Follow-
ing the submission deadline, NIST reviewed the candidates and filtered out
those which did not meet the minimum submission requirements. The com-
petition then proceeds in two rounds, in which the pool of candidate hash
functions will be reduced to the final algorithm(s) which will be used in the
SHA-3 standard.
3.2.2 Round One
On November 1, NIST began reviewing the submissions and selecting those
that met the minimum requirements for inclusion in round one of the compe-
tition. Sixty-four hash functions were submitted to NIST before the deadline.
After internal review, NIST found 51 of the 64 submissions to meet the mini-
mum submission requirements, and these submissions became the first round
candidates [3].
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In February of 2009, NIST held the First SHA-3 Candidate Conference at
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven in Belgium. The purpose of this conference
was to formally announce the first round candidates and provide the public
opportunities to question the hash function creators regarding their submis-
sions [27]. This marked the beginning of the competition’s first round, which
will last for approximately twelve months after which there will be a second
conference announcing those candidates which survived to the second round.
The candidates that made it into the first round are listed in Table 3.1
[2]. Those which at the time of this writing have been conceded broken and
withdrawn are marked as such.
Table 3.1: SHA-3 Round One candidates
Hash Name Principal Submitter
Abacus (conceded broken) Neil Sholer
ARIRANG Jongin Lim
AURORA Masahiro Fujita (Sony)
BLAKE Jean-Philippe Aumasson
Blender Colin Bradbury
Blue Midnight Wish Svein Johan Knapskog
BOOLE (conceded broken) Greg Rose
Cheetah Dmitry Khovratovich
CHI Phillip Hawkes
CRUNCH Jacques Patarin
CubeHash D. J. Bernstein
DCH (conceded broken) David A. Wilson
Dynamic SHA Xu Zijie
Dynamic SHA2 Xu Zijie
ECHO Henri Gilbert
ECOH Daniel R. L. Brown
EDON-R Danilo Gligoroski
EnRUPT Sean O’Neil
ESSENCE Jason Worth Martin
FSB Matthieu Finiasz
Fugue Charanjit S. Jutla
Grøstl Lars Ramkilde Knudsen
Continued on the next page . . .
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Table 3.1: (continued)
Hamsi O¨zgu¨l Ku¨c¸u¨k
JH Hongjun Wu
Keccak Joan Daemen
Khichidi-1 (conceded broken) M. Vidyasagar
LANE Sebastiann Indesteege
Lesamnta Hirotaka Yoshida
Luffa Dai Watanabe
LUX Ivica Nikolic´
MCSSHA-3 Mikhail Maslennikov
MD6 Ronald L. Rivest
MeshHash (conceded broken) Bjo¨rn Fay
NaSHA Smile Markovski
SANDstorm Rich Schroeppel
Sarmal Kerem Varıcı
Sga`il Peter Maxwell
Shabal Jean-Franc¸ois Misarsky
SHAMATA (conceded broken) Orhun Kara
SHAvite-3 Orr Dunkelman
SIMD Gae¨tan Leurent
Skein Bruce Schneier
Spectral Hash C¸etin Kaya Koc¸
StreamHash (conceded broken) Michal Trojnara
SWIFFTX Daniele Micciancio
Tangle (conceded broken) Rafael Alvarez
TIB3 Daniel Penazzi
Twister Michael Gorski
Vortex Michael Kounavis
WaMM (conceded broken) John Washburn
Waterfall (conceded broken) Bob Hattersley
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Chapter 4
Cube Attacks
4.1 Overview
In parallel with these developments in the field of cryptographic hash func-
tions, a new type of cryptanalytical attack, called a Cube Attack, was de-
veloped. In September 2008, Itai Dinur and Adi Shamir released a paper
entitled “Cube Attacks on Tweakable Black Box Polynomials” [14] in which
they described this new type of attack.
Cube attacks are particularly interesting in that they are a new form of
generic attack; they can be applied to any cryptosystem that takes secret and
public inputs to produce an attack that derives the secret input. Additionally,
for the attack to be successful, no knowledge of the cryptosystem under attack
is necessary; the cryptosystem can be treated like a “black box.”
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, cube attacks are not limited by
the size of a cryptosystem’s output bit polynomials, but instead are limited
solely by the degree of those polynomials. Hence, a cryptosystem can have
corresponding polynomials that contain arbitrarily many terms, but as long
as the degree of those polynomials is sufficiently small, the cryptosystem is
vulnerable to a cube attack.
In the following sections, we will provide a summary description of Dinur
and Shamir’s cube attacks. Please note that all credit for the ideas presented
in this chapter goes to Dinur and Shamir. For a more detailed description,
we refer the reader to [14].
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4.2 Terminology
A cryptosystem to which a cube attack is to be applied is viewed as a series
of binary polynomials over GF(2), one polynomial for each bit of output
the cryptosystem produces. (From this point on, all polynomials referred
to in this chapter are presumed to be binary polynomials over GF(2) unless
otherwise specified.) Each polynomial takes the cryptosystem’s secret and
public inputs and produces a single bit output. The cryptosystem under
attack must also take both a secret input and a public input, e.g., a cipher
which takes a key and a plaintext.
Definition 4.1. Assume some polynomial p(x1, . . . , xn) and a set I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}
of indices to the variables of p. Let tI be a subterm of p which is the product
of the variables indexed by I. Then factoring p by tI , yields
p(x1, . . . , xn) ≡ tI · pS(I) + q(x1, . . . , xn)
where we will call pS(I) the superpoly of I in p, and q is the linear combination
of all terms which do not contain tI .
Definition 4.2. A maxterm is a term tI with a corresponding superpoly
pS(I) such that deg(pS(I)) = 1, i.e. the superpoly of I in p is a non-constant
linear polynomial.
Definition 4.3. Any k-size subset I of indices to variables in a polynomial p
defines a k-dimensional boolean cube with corners corresponding to all pos-
sible assignments of 0/1 to the variables in I. This cube can be represented
by a set CI of 2
k vectors corresponding to the cube’s corners. For a vector
v ∈ CI , we define p|v to be a derivation of p in which the variables in I are
set to the values in v.
We define pI to be the sum of all such derived polynomials on the cube
CI , i.e. pI ,
∑
v∈CI p|v. We say that pI is p summed over the cube CI .
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4.3 Cube Attack Theory
4.3.1 Structure
A cube attack presumes a cryptosystem which takes a secret and a public
input. The attacker has no knowledge of the cryptosystem but is given access
to two things:
1. A simulator which takes pairs of secret and public inputs and produces
outputs.
2. An oracle which contains a hidden secret and when given a public input
will produce an output.
What a cube attack allows the attacker to do is to derive the oracle’s secret
given these starting parameters.
4.3.2 The primary observation
The primary observation on which cube attacks are built is deceptively sim-
ple:
Theorem 4.1. For any polynomial p and subset of variables I, pI ≡ pS(I)
mod 2.
(See [14, §3] for a proof of this theorem.)
Stated another way, the value of any superpoly can be computed by
computing the sum of the values of the entire polynomial for each vector in
the superpoly’s cube.
Let’s consider a small example. Let p be a polynomial with public inputs
v1, v2 and secret inputs x1, x2, x3.
p(v1, v2, x1, x2, x3) = v1v2x1 + v1v2x2 + v2x2x3 + v1v2 + v2 + x1x3 + x3 + 1
= v1v2(x1 + x2 + 1) + (v2x2x3 + x1x3 + v2 + x3 + 1)
Now, consider a set I which defines a cube CI and its corresponding
subterm and superpoly.
I = {1, 2}
tI = v1v2
pS(I) = x1 + x2 + 1
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Summing p over the cube CI produces the value of the superpoly pS(I).
pI = 0 · 0(x1 + x2 + 1) + (0 · x2 · x3 + x1 · x3 + 0 + x3 + 1)
+ 0 · 1(x1 + x2 + 1) + (1 · x2 · x3 + x1 · x3 + 1 + x3 + 1)
+ 1 · 0(x1 + x2 + 1) + (0 · x2 · x3 + x1 · x3 + 0 + x3 + 1)
+ 1 · 1(x1 + x2 + 1) + (1 · x2 · x3 + x1 · x3 + 1 + x3 + 1)
= x1 + x2 + 1
4.3.3 Secondary observations
From this we can derive several other observations:
• The value of a superpoly pS(I) on the secret input bits is the value of
pI . No knowledge of the internal algebraic structure of p is necessary.
• The superpoly pS(I) of any maxterm tI is linear. (This follows from the
definition of a maxterm.)
• If we can find maxterms on the public input bits, and set all other
public input bits to zero, if their corresponding superpolys exist and
are non-constant, then we have a set of linear polynomials on the secret
input bits which can be used to form a system of linear equations.
• For a polynomial p of degree d, the degree of any maxterm tI is at most
d− 1.
• Computing p over some cube CI requires 2|I| evaluations of p. Since
|I| ≤ d − 1 for any maxterm tI , then the complexity of computing a
superpoly value is O(2d−1) evaluations of p.
• Presume p has n secret input bits and m public input bits. Since
computing p over some cube is of complexity O(2d−1), we could brute
force guess b of the n secret bits for some b ≤ d− 1 without increasing
this complexity. Doing so could make a cube attack easier since there
would now be only n− b secret bits it must recover.
4.3.4 Cube attacks in a nutshell
This finally leads us to a general description of a cube attack.
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1. Find maxterms on the public input bits with linearly independent su-
perpolys on the secret input bits by simulating the victim function with
crafted public and secret inputs.
2. For each superpoly on the secret inputs, query the oracle for each vector
in the maxterm’s cube. Combine the superpolys and their values to
form a system of linear equations.
3. Solve the system of linear equations for the secret. (This can be com-
bined with brute forcing some of the secret bits if the superpolys don’t
cover all of them.)
4.4 Precomputation
Having now described the theory and general form of a cube attack, we
turn our attention to specifics. A cube attack can be split into two phases:
precomputation and an online attack. Precomputation is the part of the
attack which can be done independent of the oracle. The online attack is the
phase in which the results from precomputation are used to query the oracle
and derive the secret.
In the precomputation phase, the objective is to find maxterms that cor-
respond to superpolys on the secret bits and to derive the algebraic struc-
ture of those superpolys. Once enough linearly independent superpolys have
been found, they can stored and used in all subsequent online attacks on
this cryptosystem. (In other words, precomputation is performed once for a
cryptosystem and then used to query arbitrarily many oracles.)
4.4.1 Deriving superpolys
We know from Definition 4.2 that there is a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween a maxterm and a superpoly. Since a cube attack presumes no starting
knowledge of the cryptosystem’s algebraic structure, we must derive the al-
gebraic structure of a superpoly from its maxterm.
Given a superpoly pS(I), we know it is composed of single variable terms
of the form xj for some secret bit index j and a constant term (either 0 or 1
since we are operating in GF(2)). So, a superpoly’s algebraic structure can
be derived by simply finding the coefficients for all xj and the value of its
constant term. These values can be determined as follows:
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Constant term: Compute the value of pI with all inputs set to zero except
for the variables in I.
Coefficient of xj: Compute the value of pI with all inputs set to zero
except for the variables in I and xj which is set to one. The superpoly
contains xj if and only if the result differs from the result for the constant
term.
Since knowing a maxterm tI means knowing its set of public input bit
indices I, this method allows us to determine the algebraic structure of a
superpoly pS(I) solely through knowledge of its maxterm tI and complete
evaluations of the polynomial p.
4.4.2 Finding maxterms
Since a maxterm’s superpoly is linear, we know that for some maxterm t in
polynomial p of degree d there is no term q in p such that t|q and deg(q) >
deg(t) + 1. Therefore, for dense polynomials (such as those found in most
cryptosystems), it is highly likely that deg(t) will be very close to d− 1.
To find maxterms then, our best bet is to search for them near the degree
d of the polynomial. While there are no doubt many ways to do this, one
way is a random walk such as the one described below.
1. Presume a polynomial p with n secret input bits, m public input bits,
and an unknown degree of d.
2. Choose some 1 ≤ k ≤ m and a subset I of k public variables.
3. Compute the value of pI , holding all public variables not in I constant
(e.g., setting them to zero).
• If I is too big, then pS(I) will be constant.
– Test by computing pI for several different secret inputs and
checking that the result is always the same.
– If it is, then drop one variable from I.
• If I is too small, then pS(I) will be nonlinear.
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– Test using a nonlinearity test, e.g., by choosing secret inputs
x and y and verifying that pI(0) + pI(x) + pI(y) = pI(x + y)
holds a sufficient number of times, as in [14].
– If it’s nonlinear, then add a new public variable to I.
4. If pS(I) is linear at the borderline between a constant and nonlinear
result, then we’ve found a maxterm and d ≥ k + 1. Record I.
5. Otherwise, go back to Step 2 and try with a new I.
6. Repeat from Step 2 above (optionally starting with k = d − 1 for our
current best guess of d) until we have a set of maxterms which have
n− b corresponding superpolys that are linearly independent, where b
is the number of secret bits we plan to obtain by brute force guessing.
4.5 Online Attack
Once enough linearly independent superpolys have been found, an online
attack can be initiated. The structure of the online attack is comparatively
quite simple:
1. For each linear polynomial pS(I), find its value using Theorem 4.1, i.e.
querying the oracle for every assignment of public input bits in its
cube (leaving all other public input bits held constant) and summing
the results.
2. Combine the values with the superpolys to form a system of linear
equations on the secret input bits hidden in the oracle.
3. If we have n superpoly equations, then solve the system to reveal the
values of the secret input bits.
If we chose to brute force guess b of the n secret bits, then we only have
n− b superpoly equations. Fix those n− b superpoly equations and for
each v ∈ {0, 1}b add b equations setting the remaining b secret bits to
v and solve the system. Solve all 2b such systems of linear equations
and test their resulting secrets in order to find the values of the secret
input bits.
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4.5.1 Attacking multiple output bits
In describing this attack, we have not made much mention of the cryptosys-
tem’s output, especially the number of bits in that output. We have noted
that each output bit of a cryptosystem can be defined as a polynomial on
all the cryptosystem’s inputs (both secret and public). Most cryptosystems
have multiple output bits, and this means there are multiple output bit poly-
nomials to attack.
A cube attack can work successfully against a single output bit, but it
is frequently more efficient to target multiple output bits. When targeting
multiple output bits, one simply tests a potential maxterm on all targeted
output bits in parallel and associates any superpolys found with the output
bit they were found on. Therefore, a single maxterm can be associated with
multiple superpolys from different output bits, though there is still a one-
to-one mapping between a maxterm and superpoly for a given output bit.
When a superpoly’s value is computed, only the output bit that superpoly is
associated with is considered. In this way, a cube attack can target multiple
output bits of a cryptosystem in parallel.
4.6 Complexity
As previously noted the complexity of a cube attack is limited by the degree
of the output bit polynomials of the cryptosystem under attack. Since com-
plexity of an attack generally refers to the online phase of the attack, we will
consider the online phase first.
Consider a polynomial p of degree d with n secret input bits and m public
input bits. The complexity of computing the values of n superpolys is at most
2d−1n queries to the oracle. The complexity of solving the system of linear
equations is O(n2) 1.
So the total complexity of the online attack is O(2d−1n) +O(n2).
As for the preprocessing phase, it is composed of a number of cube eval-
uations, each of which take O(2d−1) simulations of the cryptosystem. The
exact number of cube evaluations will depend on the method used to find
maxterms and how many maxterm guesses will fail, which in turn depends
on the structure of the cryptosystem.
1Provided that the matrix of superpoly linear equations is nonsingular, which can be
enforced by simply finding a few more superpolys if necessary.
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It should be noted that the value of d is generally not known prior to the
attack, so while the upper bound exists, the attacker does not necessarily
know what it is. Methods for estimating d are covered in Chapter 5.
The memory complexity of both the preprocessing and online attacks is
negligible.
4.7 A Short Example
Let us now consider a very small example of a complete cube attack. Consider
a function p(v0, v1, v2, x0, x1, x2) where v0, v1, v2 are the public inputs and
x0, x1, x2 are the secret inputs. In order to aid understanding, we provide
the definition of p:
p(v0, v1, v2, x0, x1, x2) = v0v1x0 + v0v1x1 + v2x0x2 + v1x2 + v0x0 + v0v1
+ x0x2 + v1 + x2 + 1
However, it should be noted that this definition is considered unknown
within the attack. It is provided solely for the reader’s enlightenment.
4.7.1 Example precomputation
We will begin our search for maxterms with the subterm tI0 = v2 defined by
the cube indices I0 = {2}. We then have
pI0(v0, v1, x0, x1, x2) = p(v0, v1, 0, x0, x1, x2) + p(v1, v2, 1, x0, x1, x2)
However, when using some pI we will always fix the public inputs not in the
set of cube indices I to some constant (e.g. zero). We mention this as a
technicality, and for the rest of this example will simply presume that for
some pI the public inputs not in the set of cube indices I are set to zero, i.e.
pI0(x0, x1, x2) = p(0, 0, 0, x0, x1, x2) + p(0, 0, 1, x0, x1, x2)
Next, we test to see if pI0 is constant.
pI0(0, 0, 0) = 0
pI0(1, 0, 1) = 1
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Since different inputs produce different results pI0 cannot be constant.
So, we run a linearity test, choosing some x = (1, 0, 1) and y = (0, 1, 1), with
x⊕ y = (1, 1, 0).
pI0(0) + pI0(x) + pI0(y) = pI0(x⊕ y)
pI0(0, 0, 0) + pI0(1, 0, 1) + pI0(0, 1, 1) = pI0(1, 1, 0)
0 + 1 + 0 = 0
So the linearity test fails, too. pI0 must be nonlinear. If we cheat for a
moment and peek at the definition of p again, we see this is true:
p(v0, v1, v2, x0, x1, x2) = v0v1x0 + v0v1x1 + v2x0x2 + v1x2 + v0x0 + v0v1
+ x0x2 + v1 + x2 + 1
= tI0 · pS(I0) + q0(v0, . . . , x2)
= v2(x0x2) + (v0v1x0 + v0v1x1 + v1x2 + v0x0 + v0v1
+ x0x2 + v1 + x2 + 1)
Next, we try the subterm tI1 = v0v2 defined by cube indices I1 = {0, 2}.
We then have
pI1(x0, x1, x2) = p(0, 0, 0, x0, x1, x2) + p(0, 0, 1, x0, x1, x2)
+ p(1, 0, 0, x0, x1, x2) + p(1, 0, 1, x0, x1, x2)
Testing pI1 shows it to be constant:
pI1(0, 0, 0) = 0
pI1(0, 0, 1) = 0
pI1(0, 1, 0) = 0
pI1(0, 1, 1) = 0
pI1(1, 0, 0) = 0
pI1(1, 0, 1) = 0
pI1(1, 1, 0) = 0
pI1(1, 1, 1) = 0
This indicates that the subterm tI1 does not exist in p. If we cheat again
for a moment and peek at the definition of p, we see this is true; no term in
p contains v0v2.
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Next we try subterm tI2 = v0v1 with I2 = {0, 1}. It proves to be non-
constant
pI2(0, 0, 0) = 1
pI2(1, 0, 1) = 0
. . . and linear . . .
pI2(0) + pI2(x) + pI2(y) = pI2(x⊕ y)
pI2(0, 0, 0) + pI2(1, 0, 1) + pI2(0, 1, 1) = pI2(1, 1, 0)
1 + 0 + 0 = 1
Normally, one would perform several linearity tests to make sure that tI2
really was a maxterm, but for the sake of brevity, we will just show this one.
Now, we must deduce the superpoly pS(I2) that corresponds to tI2 . First
we compute the free term:
pI2(0, 0, 0) = 1
Next we test for the presence of each secret variable:
pI2(1, 0, 0) = 0
pI2(0, 1, 0) = 0
pI2(0, 0, 1) = 1
Since the value differs from the free term for variables x0 and x1, we now
know pS(I2) to be:
pS(I2) = 1 + x0 + x1
Hence, we now have the maxterm v0v1 defined by cube indices {0, 1} with
corresponding superpoly 1 + x0 + x1. If we cheat again for a moment and
peek at the definition of p, we can see this is true:
p(v0, v1, v2, x0, x1, x2) = v0v1x0 + v0v1x1 + v2x0x2 + v1x2 + v0x0 + v0v1
+ x0x2 + v1 + x2 + 1
= tI2 · pS(I2) + q2(v0, . . . , x2)
= v0v1(1 + x0 + x1)
+ (v2x0x2 + v1x2 + v0x0 + x0x2 + v1 + x2 + 1)
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Next we try subterm tI3 = v0 with I3 = {0}. It proves to be non-constant
pI3(0, 0, 0) = 0
pI3(0, 0, 1) = 1
. . . and linear . . .
pI3(0) + pI3(x) + pI3(y) = pI3(x⊕ y)
pI3(0, 0, 0) + pI3(1, 0, 1) + pI3(0, 1, 1) = pI3(1, 1, 0)
0 + 1 + 0 = 1
We find the superpoly free term pI3(0, 0, 0) = 0 and coefficients:
pI3(1, 0, 0) = 1
pI3(0, 1, 0) = 0
pI3(0, 0, 1) = 0
Which gives us pS(I3) = x0. If we cheat again for a moment and peek at
the definition of p, we can see this is true:
p(v0, v1, v2, x0, x1, x2) = v0v1x0 + v0v1x1 + v2x0x2 + v1x2 + v0x0 + v0v1
+ x0x2 + v1 + x2 + 1
= tI3 · pS(I3) + q3(v0, . . . , x3)
= v0(v1x0 + v1x1 + x0 + v1)
+ (v2x0x2 + v1x2 + x0x2 + v1 + x2 + 1)
At first this might seem confusing: Shouldn’t pS(I3) = v1x0+v1x1+x0+v1?
Well, technically it is. However, when we sum over the cube defined by I3,
we set all the public variables not in I3 (i.e. v1 and v2) to zero. Doing so
results in
pS(I3) = v1x0 + v1x1 + x0 + v1
⇒ 0 · x0 + 0 · x1 + x0 + 0
= x0
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Finally we try subterm tI4 = v1 with I4 = {1}. It proves to be non-constant
pI4(0, 0, 0) = 1
pI4(0, 0, 1) = 0
. . . and linear . . .
pI4(0) + pI4(x) + pI4(y) = pI4(x⊕ y)
pI4(0, 0, 0) + pI4(1, 0, 1) + pI4(0, 1, 1) = pI4(1, 1, 0)
0 + 0 + 0 = 0
We find the superpoly free term pI4(0, 0, 0) = 1 and coefficients:
pI4(1, 0, 0) = 1
pI4(0, 1, 0) = 1
pI4(0, 0, 1) = 0
Which gives us pS(I4) = 1 + x2. Peeking at the definition of p one last
time shows this is correct:
p(v0, v1, v2, x0, x1, x2) = v0v1x0 + v0v1x1 + v2x0x2 + v1x2 + v0x0 + v0v1
+ x0x2 + v1 + x2 + 1
= tI4 · pS(I4) + q4(v0, . . . , x4)
= v1(v0x0 + v0x1 + x2 + v0 + 1)
+ (v2x0x2 + v0x0 + x0x2 + x2 + 1)
Once again, we must remember that when summing over the cube defined
by I4 all public inputs not in I4 (i.e. v0 and v2) are set to zero. This results
in
pS(I4) = v0x0 + v0x1 + x2 + v0 + 1
⇒ 0 · x0 + 0 · x1 + x2 + 0 + 1
= 1 + x2
At this point, we have found three cubes with linearly independent super-
polys, as shown in Table 4.1. We may now proceed with the online attack.
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Table 4.1: Maxterms (given as cube indices) and superpolys.
Superpoly polynomial pS(I) Cube indices I
x0 {0}
1 + x0 + x1 {0, 1}
1 + x2 {1}
4.7.2 Example online attack
Let there be some oracle g(v0, v1, v2) implemented as p(v0, v1, v2, x0, x1, x2)
with a hidden secret defined by x0 = 1, x1 = 0, x2 = 1. We will use our
precomputed cube attack on p to discover this secret by querying the oracle g.
To begin our attack, we must find the values of each superpoly. Recall
from Theorem 4.1 that pS(I) = pI mod 2. This applies to the oracle g, so
for one of our cube index sets I we can find the value of its superpoly gS(I)
in the oracle by computing gI .
x0 = q{0} = g(0, 0, 0) + g(1, 0, 0) = 1
1 + x0 + x1 = q{0,1} = g(0, 0, 0) + g(1, 0, 0) + g(0, 1, 0) + g(1, 1, 0) = 0
1 + x2 = q{1} = g(0, 0, 0) + g(0, 1, 0) = 0
This gives us a system of linear equations which we solve to find
x0 = 1
x1 = 0
x2 = 1
This matches the values being hidden by the oracle g. Therefore, the cube
attack has completed successfully.
32
Chapter 5
Estimating the Effectiveness of
a Cube Attack
In [14] cube attacks were presented as a generic attack against a black box
cryptosystem. There is incredible power and utility in a generic attack that
can be used for black box cryptanalysis. However, there is also benefit in
being able to analyze a cryptosystem’s design in order to determine the
effectiveness of an attack. What we will attempt to do in this chapter is
establish a framework for analyzing a cryptosystem to determine its potential
weakness to a cube attack. We will also look into some tactics that can aide
in applying a cube attack.
5.1 Degree Analysis
At the heart of cube attacks is the concept of polynomial degree. Therefore,
the best place to begin is by looking at what kinds of operations frequently
used in cryptosystems affect degree and how they do so.
5.1.1 Basic primitives
The most basic operations used in cryptosystems are bitwise and mathemati-
cal operations. So, we will begin by analyzing how these operations translate
into arithmetic in GF(2) on their bits.
One note on notation: In this chapter, we will refer to multi-bit integers
by capital letters such as X and refer to the ith bit of X as xi using the
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corresponding lower case letter. The degree of X, d(X), is considered to be
the degree of the highest degree polynomial amongst its bits, i.e.
d(X) = max
x∈X
(d(x))
Bitwise operations
The GF(2) polynomial form and degree change of bitwise operations are as
follows:
Bitwise operation GF(2) polynomial Degree change
X ∧ Y xy d(X ∧ Y ) = d(X) + d(Y )
X ∨ Y xy + x+ y d(X ∨ Y ) = d(X) + d(Y )
X ⊕ Y x+ y d(X ⊕ Y ) = max(d(X), d(Y ))
¬X 1 + x d(¬X) = d(X)
X  n x a d(X  n) ≤ d(X)
X  n x d(X  n) ≤ d(X)
X ≪ n x d(X ≪ n) = d(X)
X ≫ n x d(X ≫ n) = d(X)
aBy this we mean that the underlying polynomials do not change. Shifts and rotates
move the polynomials to new bits, but they do not change the underlying algebraic struc-
ture of the polynomials as they move them. The exception is when bits are lost in a shift of
a fixed width integer; in these cases if the remaining bits’ polynomials are of lesser degree
than a polynomial of a bit shifted out, the degree of X decreases.
Addition and subtraction modulo 2n for some n ∈ Z+
Addition and subtraction modulo 2n remain fairly simple because the mod-
ulus operation is just a bitmask which does not really affect the underlying
polynomials other than possibly setting high bits to 0.
The GF(2) representation of X+Y is x0+y0 for bit 0 and xi+yi+ci−1 for
all bits 0 < i < n where ci = xiyi + ci−1xi + ci−1yi and c0 = x0y0. From these
formulas two important characteristics of addition become apparent. First,
addition is a bit mixing operation: It introduces bit variables to a polynomial
that are not from the bit to which that polynomial corresponds. Secondly,
the maximum degree of the output bits from an addition increases from low
bits to high bits. This is due to the carry bit which depends on all previous
bits in both X and Y . Hence, the degree of some output bit 0 ≤ j < n is
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d((X + Y )j) = max
 max
0≤k<j
d(xk) + d(yk) + ∑
k<i<j
max(d(xi),d(yi))
 ,d(xj),d(yj)

To simplify things, in most cases a pretty good estimate would be
d((X + Y )j) ≥
∑
0<i<j
max(d(xi), d(yi))
Multiplication, division, exponentiation, and addition/subtraction
modulo m where m 6= 2n for some n ∈ Z+
These cases are more complex. In general it is probably easiest to treat them
as black boxes and run a small cube test against them separately to get an
empirical idea of their degree complexity.
5.1.2 Cryptographic design primitives
There are also a number of cryptographic primitives which appear frequently
enough that they deserve special attention.
Bit shuffling permutations
Bit shuffling permutations come in a variety of shapes and sizes, but they
all pretty much do the same thing: Shuffle the bit polynomials around to
different bits. An example would be the permutation step of a substitution
permutation network. Bit shuffling, just like shifts and rotates, does not
change the algebraic structure of the bit polynomials; it just moves them to
new bit positions. As such, it has no effect on the polynomial degree.
S-Boxes
S-boxes appear in almost all block cipher and some hash function designs.
When analyzing a cipher that uses an S-box, there are one of three choices:
treat it as a block box function and run a cube attack against it to see
what degree maxterms it will yield, compute its output bit polynomials, or
simply compute the upper bound of its degree based on the number of input
bits it takes. Since some S-boxes have a small input size, the last option
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can occasionally be useful. The degree of an S-box can be expressed by the
inequality
d(S(X)) ≤ |X| ·max
x∈X
(d(x))
So for an S-box with 8 inputs and a set of inputs whose highest degree is
4, the degree of the S-box output would be at most 32.
With an S-box that has a small number of inputs, it may frequently
be more useful to just compute its output bit polynomials. This is useful
not only to determine the degree of the S-box outputs but also to look for
configurations where low degree maxterms might be created.
Finally if all else fails, just running a cube attack against the S-box and
using the empirical results in the larger estimation can suffice. This may be
the only option for S-boxes with a significant number of inputs.
Rounds
For the sake of this discussion, we will define a round function as a function
whose output is fed back into itself as its input a fixed number of times. In
most cases, the round function operates on all its input and tries to reflect
that in its output. In these cases, given a round function R which is cycled
through n rounds, the degree of n round applications is bounded by (d(R))n.
In some cases a “round” doesn’t actually modify the degree of its entire
output (e.g., a shift register of some type). In these cases, the output usually
needs to be subdivided and analyzed separately. (An example of this will be
seen later in our analysis of the ESSENCE compression function.)
5.1.3 Tying it all together
To estimate the bound on the degree of an entire cryptographic function, one
simply follows its input starting with a degree of one for each output bit and
changing the degree with each primitive encountered. If a construct is en-
countered that has an unknown, confusing, or excessively complex structure,
one can run a cube attack against that construct in isolation, add one to the
degree of the largest maxterm found in a working attack, and use that as the
degree estimation for that construct. If one cannot even get a working cube
attack against the construct, then it’s unlikely that a cube attack against the
cryptosystem will be successful.
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5.2 Tactics and Gotchas
Having established a system of estimating the bound on the degree of a
cryptosystem, one may become discouraged when discovering that the degree
of a particular cryptosystem could be painfully high. This does not always
mean a cube attack will fail (though it’s frequently a good indicator). In any
situation though, there are certain things to keep in mind.
5.2.1 Secret data flow
The purpose of a cube attack is to extract the secret, usually a key. As such,
the secret is the only thing we care about. Examine and watch the data
flow within a cryptosystem’s design. There may be all kind of complicated
things going on, but the only thing we care about is where the public input
and secret input bits combine and are rearranged. As a result, one can often
safely ignore various kinds of generation or expansion components and just
look at how their results change the shape of the public and secret input bit
interactions.
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind what is really being attacked.
If one is attacking a cryptsystem with a key, is it necessary to make the key
bits the secret bits of the attack? Is the key expansion phase reversible? If
so, then the secret bits could be the expanded key, and the the expansion
could be reversed to recover the original key. This removes the degree of the
key expansion from the degree of difficulty affecting the attack. Going a step
further, is the key even necessary? If the application of the attack can work
solely with the key expansion, then there is no need to increase the difficulty
of the attack by recovering the key when the expansion is sufficient.
Through whatever ways available, one should cut away at the cryptosys-
tem so as to run the cube attack as close as possible to the “heart” of the
cryptosystem. The closer one gets to the center, the more likely the degree
will be low and the easier the attack will be.
5.2.2 The elusive maxterm
Just because the degree of a cryptosystem is high, it does not mean that all
the usable maxterms are of degree one less than that. Frequently, maxterms
will be found of degree that are considerably lower than the degree of the
cryptosystem. This is because in a cube attack all the public input bits that
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are not in the maxterm are fixed, usually to zero. This tends to annihilate
a lot of higher degree terms. The minimum degree of usable maxterms is
usually less influenced by the degree of the cryptosystem than it is by the ratio
of the number of secret bits to the number of public bits in the polynomial’s
terms and the extent to which the secret bits have diffused throughout the
polynomial. The degree of the cryptosystem just establishes an upper bound
near which we have a very high probability of finding maxterms.
It should also be noted though that if one notices the presence of a low
degree term composed of a few public input bits and one secret bit, that
does not indicate the existence of a maxterm. If there also exists another
term in the same polynomial in which the same public and secret bits exist
along with another secret bit, the corresponding superpoly for the subterm
composed of those public bits would not be linear, and therefore the subterm
would not be a maxterm.
5.2.3 Hybrid attacks
Finally, whenever possible it is best to combine cube attacks with other meth-
ods in order to cut high degree components out and bring the cube attack
closer to the heart of the cryptosystem. If a component of the cryptosystem
is reversible or easily attacked by some other method, have the cube attack
begin or end just after or before that component, and then use some other
method to pass through that component and connect with the cube attack.
Examples of components that can frequently be left out of a cube attack
and be handled by some other means are key expansion, initialization phases,
and finalization phases. By removing these components, the degree of the
modified cryptosystem usually decreases, giving a cube attack a better chance
of success.
These types of hybrid attacks could be particularly useful against cryp-
tosystems that heavily rely on their initialization or finalization steps to raise
their degree.
38
Chapter 6
Attacks on SHA-3 Candidates
Having laid the foundation of cube attacks, we now turn our attention to
their application to candidates in the SHA-3 hash function competition. We
found that very few hash functions were succeptible to a pure cube attack,
but we did find successful reduced-round attacks against the ESSENCE and
Keccak hash functions.
We will discuss these reduced-round attacks, as well as briefly mentioning
several other hash functions we found resilient to pure cube attacks.
6.1 Attack on Reduced-Round ESSENCE
6.1.1 The ESSENCE hash function
ESSENCE is a candidate for the SHA-3 hash function competition run by
NIST [21]. It is described by its authors as “a family of hash functions”
because it has a number of configurable parameters. However, we will devote
our attention only to the variant of ESSENCE defined by the configuration
values set for the official submission of ESSENCE to NIST.
General Structure
We will not attempt to provide a complete specification of ESSENCE, but
will instead focus on describing the primary characteristics of its structure
as a hash function.
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Two compression functions: ESSENCE employs two compression func-
tions, one for processing 256 bit blocks and one for processing 512 bit blocks.
Which function is used is determined by the size of the output hash requested.
Message partitioning: As a hash function, ESSENCE takes an arbitrarily
long message. This message is internally split into “chunks” of 1048576 bytes
(one megabyte) in size, except for the last chunk which may be smaller. Each
of these chunks is further subdivided into 256 or 512 bit blocks depending
on which compression function is being used.
Padding: If the message data for the last block of the last chunk is not a
full block size in length, it is padded with zeros.
Chaining structure: The design of ESSENCE provides for parallelism
through the use of Merkle hash trees. However, the tree depth is set to 0
in the configuration of the official variant of ESSENCE submitted to NIST.
This produces a sequential design.
Each chunk is hashed separately using the compression function and a
standard Merkle-Damg˚ard chaining structure. The resulting hashes from
each chunk are then taken to form the blocks of a new “message” and are
also hashed together using a Merkle-Damg˚ard chaining structure. The result
is that the final ESSENCE hash is essentially a hash of hashes.
Finalization: When producing the final ESSENCE hash by hashing the
chunk hashes, a final block is appended to the sequence of chunk hashes.
This final block contains the various configuration values used by the variant
of ESSENCE being employed as well as the number of chunks in the message
in order to prevent length extension attacks. All this data is stored in the
first 256 bits of the final block. If a 512 bit compression function is being
used, then the last 256 bits of the final block are the hexadecimal expansion
of the fractional part of pi starting with the 64th digit.
So the final ESSENCE hash is the hash of each of the chunk hashes and
the final block.
Initialization vectors: The initialization vector used in the Merkle-Damg˚ard
chain of the final hash is set to the hexadecimal expansion of the fractional
part of pi. The initialization vectors used for individual blocks within a chunk
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are composed of configuration information for the ESSENCE variant in use
as well as the sequence number of the chunk being processed. This data is
256 bits long; if the compression function is 512 bits then the last 256 bits
of the chunk IV are the same as the last 256 bits of the IV used for the final
hash (i.e. values from the fractional part of pi).
The Compression Function
As previously noted, ESSENCE has two different compression functions, one
for 256 bit outputs and one for 512 bits outputs. Both compression functions
are Davies-Meyer constructions based on keyed permutations, respectively
called E256 and E512 permutations. The only difference between these per-
mutations is in the size of the registers used (respectively 32 or 64 bits) and
the L permutation (respectively called L32 and L64). When the discussion
applies to both permutations, we will simply refer to them as E.
The E permutation takes a key k and a sequence of eight registers r0, . . . , r7
and produces a new sequence of eight registers. It is a feedback shift register
which is defined as follows [22]:
E(k, {r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6, r7}) =
{F (r6, r5, r4, r3, r2, r1, r0)⊕ r7⊕ L(r0)⊕ k, r0, r1, r2, r3, r4, r5, r6}
(6.1)
The size of the registers r0, . . . , r7 and the key k are 32 bits for E256 and
64 bits for E512.
The feedback function F is a bitwise function with each bit of its output
independently depending on the same bit in each input variable (i.e. just
as in other bitwise operations like bitwise AND). F can then be defined for
single bit input variables as a function in GF(2) defined by the following
polynomial [22]:
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F (a, b, c, d, e, f, g) = abcdefg + abcdef + abcefg + acdefg+
abceg + abdef + abdeg + abefg+
acdef + acdfg + acefg + adefg+
bcdfg + bdefg + cdefg+
abcf + abcg + abdg + acdf + adef+
adeg + adfg + bcde+ bceg + bdeg + cdef+
abc+ abe+ abf + abg + acg + adf+
adg + aef + aeg + bcf + bcg + bde+
bdf + beg + bfg + cde+ cdf + def+
deg + dfg+
ad+ ae+ bc+ bd+ cd+
ce+ df + dg + ef + fg+
a+ b+ c+ f + 1
(6.2)
Finally, the linear function L is a linear feedback shift register in the
Galois configuration. For L64 the characteristic polynomial is
p64(x) = x
64 + x63 + x61 + x60 + x55 + x53 + x50 + x49+
x46 + x44 + x41 + x40 + x36 + x33 + x32+
x31 + x30 + x29 + x26 + x25 + x23 + x20 + x18 + x17+
x14 + x13 + x11 + x8 + x7 + x4 + x2 + x+ 1
(6.3)
For L32 the characteristic polynomial is
p32(x) = x
32 + x31 + x24 + x22 + x19 + x17+
x13 + x12 + x11 + x9 + x8 + x5 + x4 + x2 + 1
(6.4)
In both cases, a call to Li(x) initializes the LFSR with x and shifts it i
steps [22].
Having now defined the E permutation, we can define the ESSENCE com-
pression function G(R,K, n). As previously noted, there are two compression
functions: They are G256 which uses E256 and G512 which uses E512. Just as
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with the E permutation, we will refer to both compression functions as G
when the discussion applies to them both.
The compression function G(R,K, n) is essentially two connected E per-
mutations. It is parameterized by the sequence of integers R which initializes
the registers in the primary permutation ER, a sequence of integers K which
initializes a sequence of key registers in the key scheduling permutation EK ,
and the number of rounds n to step both permutations. The key scheduling
permutation EK varies slightly from an ordinary E permutation in that it
does not have a key value being exclusive or’ed into it with each step, but
instead its output provides the key value for each round of the ER permuta-
tion.
The compression function G(R,K, n) can be formally defined as:
Algorithm 1 Compression function G(R,K, n)
K ′ ← K
R′ ← R
for i = 1 to n do
R′ ← E(K ′[7], R′) {the ER permutation}
K ′ ← E(0, K ′) {the EK permutation}
end for
return R⊕R′
ESSENCE employs the G(R,K, n) compression function in Davies-Meyer
mode with the number of rounds n fixed at 32, i.e.
H0 = IV
Hi = G(Hi−1,Mi−1, 32)
where Hi is the new hash formed by the addition of a message block Mi−1.
6.1.2 Cube attack on a reduced-round ESSENCE com-
pression function
We attacked reduced-round variants of both the 256-bit ESSENCE hash
function and the ESSENCE G256(R,K, n) compression function. We will
consider the compression function first.
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Attack configuration
Since cube attacks are structured to recover some kind of secret, we used
the compression function to make a very naive HMAC: The first 32 bits of
the message block stored a secret value, and the remaining 224 bits stored a
public value. We used only 32 bits for the secret so that it would fill exactly
one register of the E permutation; this was done to ease analysis.1 Just
as in the ESSENCE hash function itself, we call the compression function
with R = IV and K = M , where IV is an initialization vector and M
is the message block composed of the secret and public values. With this
configuration we used cube attacks to attempt a partial pre-image attack
against the ESSENCE compression function.
Attack results
As previously noted, the official ESSENCE configuration sets the number of
rounds to 32, i.e. the compression function is G(R,K, 32). We successfully
found a complete cube attack that recovers the full 32-bit secret on up to 19
rounds, i.e. G256(IV,M, 19).
In Table 6.1 we give our precomputation of the attack. In each row we
give a superpoly pS(I), the cube indices I that define the corresponding max-
term tI , and the output bit the superpoly resides on. Note that because we
attacked all output bits in parallel, a single maxterm may be associated with
multiple superpolys on multiple output bits. In the superpoly polynomials,
an xj variable refers to bit j of the secret input. Likewise, a cube index i
refers to bit i of the public input. Note that these bit indices are indices into
the secret and public inputs, not indices into the hash input, so both secret
and public bit indices start from 0. To convert this to hash input bit indices
using our partial pre-image attack configuration, the secret bit indices would
remain the same and the public bit indices would be increased by 32.
Finally, we should note that the maxterms given in this table (via their
cube indices) are simply the first ones we found that had linearly independent
superpolys; we did a random walk and every time we found a maxterm with
a superpoly that was linearly independent to those we already had, we added
it to our list. There are certainly more such maxterms, but only these were
necessary to mount an attack.
1The attack can be extended to larger secret values, but it becomes marginally more
difficult as the ratio of initial secret value registers to public value registers increases.
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Table 6.1: Maxterms for 19 round ESSENCE compress:
G256(IV,M, 19)
Superpoly Polynomail Cube Indices Output Bit Index
1 + x1 {4,6,21} 234
1 + x6 {0,4,30} 225
x10 {0,4,30} 234
x0 + x6 + x10 {0,4,30} 253
x7 + x12 {5,7} 233
x6 + x14 {0,4,30} 238
x18 {18,20,46} 253
x1 + x2 + x4 + x6 + x14 + x16 + x18 {14,25} 242
x3 + x19 {11,13,19} 238
1 + x3 + x17 + x19 {11,13,19} 241
x16 + x19 + x21 {19,20} 226
1 + x3 + x13 + x21 {11,13,19} 224
1 + x19 + x21 {11,13,19} 228
x8 + x21 {19,20,59} 226
1 + x6 + x11 + x12 + x21 {0,11,26} 230
1 + x3 + x5 + x15 + x17 + x23 {19,20,59} 235
x1 + x4 + x6 + x14 + x25 {14,25} 238
1 + x1 + x5 + x6 + x15 + x18 + x21 + x26 {19,20,59} 224
1+x4+x9+x10+x12+x13+x16+x19+x26+x27 {18,45} 233
1 + x27 {4,6,21} 239
1 + x4 + x12 + x15 + x23 + x25 + x27 {18,20,46} 236
1 + x4 + x8 + x17 + x19 + x23 + x24 + x27 {18,20,46} 240
1 + x28 {11,13,19} 252
1 + x16 + x19 + x21 + x24 + x29 {19,20} 250
1 + x3 + x8 + x21 + x24 + x29 {19,20,59} 250
x2 + x3 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x10 + x11 + x14 + x16 +
x18 + x26 + x27 + x30
{20,27,214} 235
1 + x2 + x5 + x6 + x15 + x22 + x25 + x31 {5,11,61} 225
1+x2 +x3 +x5 +x6 +x7 +x10 +x11 +x14 +x18 +
x20 + x26 + x27 + x31
{20,27,214} 230
1+x0 +x5 +x8 +x10 +x14 +x17 +x18 +x26 +x31 {0,16,57} 248
1+x13+x14+x17+x23+x24+x25+x26+x29+x31 {0,16,57} 254
x4+x15+x17+x18+x22+x23+x24+x25+x27+x31 {18,20,46} 248
1 + x31 {18,20,46} 249
Since the largest cube size is 3 and there are 32 secret bits to solve for, the
complexity of the attack is 28 compressions. In terms of real-world timing, a
search for a set of maxterms like those listed above takes us about 15 seconds
on a desktop PC, and the online attack is practically instantaneous.
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We also found the following 7-cube on 20 rounds. (We will discuss why
we stopped our full attack at 19 rounds in the analysis section.)
Table 6.2: Maxterm for 20 round ESSENCE compress G256(IV,M, 20)
Superpoly Polynomial Cube Indices Output Bit Index
1 + x0 + x1 + x9 + x17 + x27 + x28 + x31 {0,1,20,27,28,29,64} 227
As was noted previously, we restricted the secret input size to 32 bits in
order to ease analysis. The attack still works on larger secret sizes, albeit
with slightly higher complexity. For example, we have successfully attacked
18 round ESSENCE compress using a configuration with 64-bit secret and
192-bit public and obtained results similar to the attack on 19 rounds detailed
above.
6.1.3 Cube attack on reduced-round ESSENCE
We attacked a reduced-round variant of the complete 256 bit ESSENCE hash
function. Due to its 0-depth hash tree construction, this is more difficult
than attacking just the compression function as the message block effectively
gets compressed twice. We used the naive HMAC setup as was applied to
the compression function and achieved a complete cube attack on 9 rounds.
Once again the goal was a partial pre-image attack to recover the 32 secret
input bits. The maxterm cube indices and superpolys used in the attack are
below:2
Table 6.3: Maxterms for 9 round ESSENCE
Superpoly Polynomial Cube Indices Output Bit Index
1 + x3 {2,21} 225
x4 {0,19} 235
x1 + x3 + x6 {21,24} 225
x9 {15,28} 229
x2 + x9 {2,11} 252
x11 {8,22} 235
x2 + x3 + x9 + x14 {2,11} 238
1 + x4 + x18 {0,19} 238
1 + x6 + x9 + x20 {9,20} 225
1 + x4 + x21 {0,19} 230
Continued on the next page . . .
2Once again more such maxterms and superpolys exist, but they are not necessary for
a complete attack.
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Table 6.3: (continued)
x1 + x3 + x9 + x12 + x23 {9,23} 235
1 + x6 + x24 {1,4} 231
x13 + x24 {2,13} 254
x5 + x12 + x24 {5,26} 233
1 + x28 {2,13} 252
1 + x1 + x6 + x24 + x29 {1,4} 253
x5 +x8 +x9 +x11 +x15 +x19 +x22 +x24 +x25 +
x26 + x27 + x29
{9,60} 235
1 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x10 + x11 + x13 + x15 + x16 +
x18 + x19 + x23 + x24 + x27 + x29 + x30
{19,44} 252
1 + x0 + x2 + x9 + x10 + x11 + x12 + x14 + x15 +
x16 +x17 +x20 +x21 +x22 +x26 +x27 +x28 +x30
{22,45} 254
x30 {8,22} 254
1 + x3 + x25 + x30 {3,9} 254
1 +x0 +x2 +x3 +x6 +x7 +x9 +x10 +x11 +x17 +
x20 + x21 + x22 + x26 + x30
{0,19} 225
x0 +x1 +x2 +x3 +x4 +x6 +x7 +x9 +x10 +x11 +
x17 + x18 + x20 + x21 + x22 + x26 + x30
{0,19} 248
x0+x1+x2+x4+x5+x6+x7+x8+x9+x10+x12+
x15+x18+x22+x23+x24+x25+x26+x27+x28+x30
{0,18} 235
1 + x0 + x1 + x2 + x5 + x12 + x14 + x15 + x16 +
x18 + x20 + x24 + x25 + x29 + x30
{21,31} 235
1 + x0 + x3 + x4 + x8 + x10 + x11 + x12 + x14 +
x15 + x17 + x20 + x21 + x22 + x28 + x29 + x30
{34,35} 254
x2 + x3 + x4 + x6 + x7 + x9 + x11 + x15 + x16 +
x18 +x19 +x21 +x22 +x23 +x26 +x29 +x30 +x31
{1,4} 252
x0 + x2 + x3 + x5 + x6 + x14 + x15 + x16 + x17 +
x18 + x20 + x24 + x25 + x29 + x30 + x31
{1,4} 254
1+x0 +x1 +x2 +x3 +x5 +x12 +x14 +x15 +x16 +
x17 + x18 + x20 + x25 + x29 + x30 + x31
{5,24} 252
1 + x0 + x4 + x6 + x7 + x13 + x15 + x17 + x18 +
x19 + x20 + x22 + x23 + x24 + x30 + x31
{24,60} 238
1 + x6 + x9 + x11 + x12 + x13 + x14 + x15 + x16 +
x17 +x18 +x19 +x22 +x25 +x26 +x27 +x28 +x31
{4,7} 225
1 + x0 + x1 + x8 + x9 + x11 + x14 + x16 + x17 +
x18 +x19 +x20 +x23 +x24 +x28 +x29 +x30 +x31
{20,60} 235
Since all the maxterms are of degree 2 and there are 32 secret bits to
recover, the complexity of the attack is 27 hash computations.
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6.1.4 Analysis
At this point one may wonder why we are presenting attacks of such low
complexity. It seems that if attacks of such low complexity could be found
then more difficult yet still feasible attacks should exist by extension to higher
rounds. It turns out that the ESSENCE compression function has some
very interesting algebraic peculiarities which make it difficult to predict the
existence and degree of maxterms.
Analysis of the compression function
If one examines the F function in Equation 6.2 that is used in the ESSENCE
compression function, one will notice that it has terms of a wide variety of
degrees. For the maximum degree d of any of its inputs, the maximum degree
of F is 7d. At the same time, four of its seven inputs also exist in its resulting
polynomial as linear terms. When a cube attack is performed, a few public
input bits are used for the cube and the rest are all fixed to some value (in
our implementation, zero). This fixing of the remaining public input bits
tends to obliterate a lot of higher terms if the cubes being used are small.
As a result, if small maxterms exist they will be found even in the presence
of much larger potential maxterms. Because the structure of F creates this
diversity of degree in terms, the degree of maxterms available for a cube
attack is frequently far below the maximum degree. (Case in point: In our
attack against G256(IV,M, 19) we solely used maxterms of degree 2 and 3, yet
we found maxterms of up to degree 9, and it is likely that the degree of the
output entire polynomial was considerably higher.) The reason we stopped
our full attack at 19 rounds has to do with the existence and frequency of
these low degree maxterms.
Before continuing, a little more notation should be laid down. In the
G256(R,K, n) compression function (see Algorithm 6.1.1), there are two E
permutations in use. We will refer to the E permutation that updates R′
as ER and the E permutation that updates K
′ as EK . Furthermore we will
refer to 8 registers used in ER as r0, . . . , r7 and the eight registers used in
EK as k0, . . . , k7. We note that the E permutation follows a feedback shift
register design (see Equation 6.1). In order to track registers as they move
through the shift register, we will use a subscript that indicates how many
times a register has passed the end of the shift register. So all registers in
ER start as r00, . . . , r70. After eight rounds, they are r01, . . . , r71, and after
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10 rounds they are r01, . . . , r51, r62, r72.
Consider now the structure of the ESSENCE compression functionG256(R,K, n).
The initialization vector is fed into ER and sets the values of r00, . . . , r70.
The message block is fed into EK and sets the values of k00, . . . , k70. In our
partial preimage cube attack, the secret value is k00 and k10, . . . , k70 are the
public value. The EK permutation is cycled and is fed into ER as the key
parameter.
Attacking 8 to 16 rounds
Now consider the state of G after 8 rounds. From the definition of the E
permutation, we know that for all 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 we have ki0 as a linear term
of ri1. Thus, a cube attack against G256(R,K, 8) succeeds by using a single
maxterm of degree 0 (i.e. fixing all the public input bits) on the output bits
corresponding to r01.
Now consider the state of G after 16 rounds. r72 contains k71 as a linear
term which in turn contains L(k00) as a linear term. Therefore, those bits
of k00 which are not removed by the L function are still accessible as linear
terms of r72 and can also be obtained through a maxterm of degree 0. The
remaining bits of k00 must be obtained through the mixing done by the F
function.
At this juncture, it is worth pointing out two things. First, the only part
of the E permutation that can raise the degree of its resulting polynomial
is the F function; all other components of E are linear. Secondly, the only
part of E that can create a polynomial dependent on multiple bits from one
register is the L function; all other components of E are bitwise operators.
After 16 rounds of G, r72, r62, and r52 contain maxterms of degree 1 that
yield a linear combination of the bits of k00. This can only be accomplished
through the work of the F and L functions. Thus, it is only after 16 of the
32 rounds in the ESSENCE compression function that some of the bits of
k00 are no longer explicitly included as linear terms in the result, and only
after 17 rounds (when r72 becomes r73) that none of the bits of k00 from its
original linear inclusion are present as linear terms.
Attacking beyond 16 rounds
At this point our access to the bits of k00 is through the mixing of F and L.
As we advance one round at a time beyond 16 rounds, it becomes increasingly
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more difficult to find maxterms with corresponding superpolys of the bits of
k00. After 19 rounds, r72, r62, and r52 have all passed the end of the shift
register. We can now find maxterms of degree 2 and 3 in r42. After twenty
rounds, we can only find maxterms as low as degree 7 in r32 with great
difficulty.
We conjecture that this is due to the nature of the F function, and that
not all registers have corresponding polynomials of equal degree. The F func-
tion takes all registers except the one passing the end of the shift register as
input. As registers pass the end of the shift register and wrap around, they
are updated with a new application of F which increases their degree. How-
ever, because F takes all the other registers as inputs, registers toward the
end of an 8 round cycle are dependent on more registers that already passed
the end of the shift register and wrapped and therefore have higher degree.
Therefore, the degree the registers’ corresponding polynomials increases from
r7 at the lowest up to r0 at the highest.
As we have already noted, the structure of F lends itself to the existence
of maxterms with degrees well below the degree of the polynomial they are
found in. We conjecture that as we move along registers ri2 with increasingly
smaller i the input of registers with higher degree into F pushes the minimal
degree maxterms into higher and higher degrees. As such, it is difficult to
say how well the attack can scale theoretically to higher numbers of rounds.
Because F creates such low degree terms, the attack will always depend on
lower degree terms even though the degree of the polynomial as a whole
would be far too large to successfully attack its maximal degree terms with
a cube attack.
We therefore cannot conclude what the theoretical limit of a successful
cube attack against the ESSENCE G256(R,K, n) compression function would
be at this time. Further in-depth analysis of the F function of the E permu-
tation is necessary to determine the nature of the existence and movement
of low degree maxterms.
Analysis of the hash function
Finally, we would point out that even if a successful attack against the com-
pression function could be mounted, this still might not compromise the
ESSENCE hash function as a whole. Because of the 0-depth hash tree design
incorporated in the official configuration of ESSENCE submitted to NIST,
a message block is effectively compressed twice, once for the “chunk” it is a
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part of and once again when that chunk’s hash is compressed along with the
final block to form the resulting hash.
The result of this is that in our experience a successful attack on the
ESSENCE hash function requires the reduced-round variant to have half as
many rounds as a corresponding reduced-round attack on the ESSENCE
compression function. It should be noted that this is merely an observation
based on empirical evidence, and we do not have theoretical analysis to back
this up; it may very well be even more difficult to translate an attack on
the compression function to the whole hash on higher rounds than we have
attempted thus far.
6.1.5 Related work
Mouha, Thomsen, and Turan observed that the ESSENCE compression func-
tion was distinguishable from a random function in [24], specifically finding
slid pairs (input pairs which produce states that are one step apart) and fixed
points for the compression function.
We are not aware of any other written analysis of ESSENCE that has
been released at this time.
6.2 Attack on Reduced-Round Keccak
6.2.1 The Keccak hash function
Keccak is another candidate submitted to NIST’s SHA-3 hash competition
[9]. Its distinguishing feature is that it is built using a “sponge construction”
[7] in which the message is “absorbed” into a sponge piece by piece, and then
the output hash is “squeezed” out of the sponge.
A complete mathematical definition of Keccak is beautifully and concisely
given in [8] in the first two pages. We therefore refer the reader to [8] for
details on Keccak’s construction. However, to provide context for the analysis
of our cube attack, we will reproduce the definition of the Keccak-f [b]
permutation which serves as Keccak’s compression function. It is defined as
a permutation on a state a which is a three-dimensional array of elements in
GF(2). The definition is as follows [8]:
Keccak-f [b] is an iterated permutation, consisting of a se-
quence of nr rounds R, indexed with ir from 0 to nr−1. A round
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consists of five steps:
R = ι ◦ χ ◦ pi ◦ ρ ◦ θ, with
θ : a[x][y][z] ← a[x][y][z] +
4∑
y′=0
a[x− 1][y′][z] +
4∑
y′=0
a[x+ 1][y′][z − 1]
ρ : a[x][y][z] ← a[x][y][z − (t+ 1)(t+ 2)/2],
with t satisfying 0 ≤ t < 24
and
(
0 1
2 3
)t(
1
0
)
=
(
x
y
)
in GF (5)2×2,
or t = −1 if x = y = 0
pi : a[x][y] ← a[x′][y′],with
(
x
y
)
=
(
0 1
2 3
)(
x′
y′
)
χ : a[x] ← a[x] + (a[x+ 1] + 1)a[x+ 2]
ι : a ← a+RC[ir]
The additions and multiplications between the terms are in
GF(2).
It should be noted that the RC[ir] added in the ι function is a round
constant. For more details on the Keccak-f [b] permutation, see [8, §1].
6.2.2 Cube attacks
To test Keccak’s resistance to cube attacks, we reduced the number of rounds
nr and attempted to execute a cube attack against the 224-bit hash size
version of Keccak. The standard number of rounds for Keccak is 18. We
successfully found cubes on reduced-round variants of Keccak of up to 4
rounds.
Since cube attacks are structured to recover some kind of secret, we con-
figured 224-bit Keccak as a very naive HMAC. We created a 224 bit message
by concatenating a 112 bit secret value and a 112 bit public value and then
hashing it3. This configuration was then subjected to a cube attack.
3Recall that in our analysis of ESSENCE we only restricted the secret input to 32 bits
in order to ease analysis. In this case, such a restriction would not affect our analysis, and
so we simply evenly divide the input between secret and public bits.
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For 4 round 224-bit Keccak, we found 112 cubes with linearly independent
superpolys on the secret input bits. The full cube search and attack took
approximately 10 minutes on a desktop PC. This could have been sped up
by searching for fewer cubes and brute force guessing some of the secret bits.
In Table 6.4 we give our precomputation of the attack. In each row we
give a superpoly pS(I), the cube indices I that define the corresponding max-
term tI , and the output bit the superpoly resides on. Note that because we
attacked all output bits in parallel, a single maxterm may be associated with
multiple superpolys on multiple output bits. In the superpoly polynomials,
an xj variable refers to bit j of the secret input. Likewise, a cube index i
refers to bit i of the public input. Note that these bit indices are indices into
the secret and public inputs, not indices into the hash input, so both secret
and public bit indices start from 0. To convert this to hash input bit indices
using our partial pre-image attack configuration, the secret bit indices would
remain the same and the public bit indices would be increased by 112.
Finally, we should note that the maxterms given in this table (via their
cube indices) are simply the first ones we found that had linearly independent
superpolys; we did a random walk and every time we found a maxterm with
a superpoly that was linearly independent to those we already had, we added
it to our list. There are certainly more such maxterms, but only these were
necessary to mount an attack.
Table 6.4: Maxterms for 4 round 224-bit Keccak
Superpoly Polynomial Cube Indices Output Bit Index
1 + x0 {0,31,36,46,62,65,77,80,84,91,94,110} 202
1 + x1 {1,15,20,24,25,35,57,58,73,80,95,106} 200
1 + x2 {1,7,12,35,40,44,66,82,92,93,104,106} 168
1 + x4 {7,10,11,19,38,43,46,52,66,70,77,83} 166
x5 {12,17,19,23,43,50,69,78,83,90,104} 177
1 + x6 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 3
x7 {6,14,16,23,30,36,43,64,87,101,105,111} 0
x8 {14,23,30,41,45,59,60,64,73,85,90,106} 191
1 + x9 {0,22,29,39,43,44,62,64,70,89,99} 97
x10 {3,9,17,19,25,28,40,50,58,65,88} 173
x11 {0,31,36,46,62,65,77,80,84,91,94,110} 55
1 + x12 {9,11,26,29,40,80,84,91,95,106,109,110} 163
1 + x17 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 162
1 + x19 {6,14,16,23,30,36,43,64,87,101,105,111} 94
1 + x21 {1,3,8,12,41,60,62,67,68,73,84,98} 212
1 + x22 {3,6,22,36,42,44,45,49,54,66,84,104} 45
Continued on the next page . . .
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Table 6.4: (continued)
x24 {5,10,13,28,39,41,46,48,58,62,76,77} 108
x26 {12,17,19,23,43,50,69,78,83,90,104} 43
1 + x27 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 27
x28 {17,30,35,37,41,45,62,70,76,80,105} 118
1 + x29 {38,40,59,61,66,80,84,92,98,104,111} 71
1 + x18 + x31 {7,10,11,19,38,43,46,52,66,70,77,83} 61
1 + x31 {27,31,33,52,54,59,60,80,83,92,108,111} 20
1 + x32 {1,5,9,13,15,42,47,49,54,80,83,109} 110
1 + x33 {20,36,39,40,42,55,56,60,61,71,99} 149
x34 {18,21,27,43,51,62,69,77,88,89,98,103} 21
x35 {6,14,16,23,30,36,43,64,87,101,105,111} 43
1 + x36 {16,30,47,52,75,76,77,82,85,90,109,110} 1
1 + x37 {2,6,26,41,57,68,89,95,99,101,110} 95
x38 {0,5,14,19,38,43,44,52,74,79,91,92} 44
1 + x42 {27,31,33,52,54,59,60,80,83,92,108,111} 43
x43 {1,3,8,12,41,60,62,67,68,73,84,98} 168
x47 {6,9,14,33,42,57,65,66,73,74,75,81} 9
x49 {20,36,39,40,42,55,56,60,61,71,99} 15
1 + x51 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 166
1 + x52 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 161
1 + x53 {3,9,17,19,25,28,40,50,58,65,88} 167
x16 + x54 {8,9,14,25,52,53,54,61,66,67,69,92} 152
1 + x54 {1,5,10,26,27,53,55,57,77,89,91,107} 179
1 + x48 + x54 {1,3,29,43,56,58,79,82,84,85,97,100} 50
x55 {1,7,11,14,18,23,60,79,91,100,101,109} 22
x56 {3,6,22,36,42,44,45,49,54,66,84,104} 155
x31 + x53 + x57 {0,10,13,18,38,64,81,88,90,92,94} 144
1 + x58 {9,11,13,16,42,44,58,67,68,78,94,109} 111
1 + x9 + x41 + x60 {4,11,26,38,45,53,59,60,61,81,89,107} 33
1 + x61 {4,8,17,24,29,44,56,65,76,85,103,110} 97
1 + x62 {4,8,17,24,29,44,56,65,76,85,103,110} 110
1 + x63 {13,18,20,33,42,62,63,87,102,107,108} 47
1 + x64 {2,17,38,42,46,55,59,66,75,96,100,107} 80
1 + x65 {5,6,16,22,29,35,43,66,73,76,102,106} 168
x41 + x65 {7,25,50,52,53,54,74,78,79,87,100} 160
1 + x66 {14,23,30,41,45,59,60,64,73,85,90,106} 77
1 + x10 + x39 + x56 + x68 {3,8,23,27,30,33,41,57,67,85,91,100} 14
1 + x6 + x69 {14,23,30,41,45,59,60,64,73,85,90,106} 87
x70 {9,12,18,33,65,68,83,90,97,101,103} 57
x68 + x71 {16,24,26,38,48,50,58,64,84,91,93} 138
x72 {0,31,36,46,62,65,77,80,84,91,94,110} 96
Continued on the next page . . .
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1 + x73 {9,12,16,17,20,42,45,58,103,107,109} 133
1 + x10 + x44 + x73 {2,4,6,26,32,45,46,47,53,75,89,110} 86
1 + x74 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 41
1 + x75 {0,5,14,19,38,43,44,52,74,79,91,92} 183
x77 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 79
1 + x2 + x3 + x13 + x77 {8,9,11,34,41,50,58,68,75,80,85,102} 115
x78 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 11
1 + x79 {17,30,35,37,41,45,62,70,76,80,105} 123
x15 + x79 {1,5,9,13,15,42,47,49,54,80,83,109} 56
1 + x81 {14,33,37,40,47,52,78,79,81,84,93,100} 80
1 + x82 {14,23,30,41,45,59,60,64,73,85,90,106} 99
x14 + x36 + x78 + x82 {1,3,8,12,41,60,62,67,68,73,84,98} 181
x20 + x83 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 36
1 + x85 {27,30,51,52,54,76,82,87,96,99,111} 137
1 + x23 + x81 + x86 {13,33,52,55,58,72,73,89,96,104,109} 110
x86 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 113
1 + x8 + x59 + x86 {27,31,33,52,54,59,60,80,83,92,108,111} 21
x9 + x51 + x87 {4,11,26,38,45,53,59,60,61,81,89,107} 123
x25 + x88 {27,31,33,52,54,59,60,80,83,92,108,111} 25
1 + x88 {4,5,24,28,44,62,65,73,80,84,93,110} 175
x89 {13,18,20,33,42,62,63,87,102,107,108} 154
1 + x90 {14,23,30,41,45,59,60,64,73,85,90,106} 148
x28 + x91 {20,43,45,52,64,83,87,94,97,98,100} 85
1 + x92 {0,7,19,21,41,42,52,56,61,66,80,83} 86
x77 + x93 {13,33,52,55,58,72,73,89,96,104,109} 6
1 + x61 + x80 + x93 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 198
x30 + x93 {27,30,51,52,54,76,82,87,96,99,111} 162
1 + x94 {27,31,33,52,54,59,60,80,83,92,108,111} 73
1 + x95 {3,9,17,19,25,28,40,50,58,65,88} 66
1 + x96 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 212
x75 + x97 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 71
x98 {27,31,33,52,54,59,60,80,83,92,108,111} 101
1 + x46 + x64 + x99 {0,5,36,37,55,62,72,80,81,88,100} 185
x23 + x100 {6,12,19,20,58,62,71,75,78,97,102,103} 141
x40 + x100 {5,6,16,22,29,35,43,66,73,76,102,106} 25
1 + x71 + x100 {12,15,27,29,31,39,44,46,50,74,84,106} 29
x28 + x38 + x101 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 177
1 + x50 + x101 {27,31,33,52,54,59,60,80,83,92,108,111} 57
1 + x102 {15,25,30,39,47,49,57,77,80,82,107} 176
1 + x84 + x102 {16,24,26,38,48,50,58,64,84,91,93} 139
1 + x83 + x102 {1,29,41,48,50,54,56,77,84,85,95} 147
Continued on the next page . . .
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1 + x13 + x103 {7,10,11,19,38,43,46,52,66,70,77,83} 133
x103 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 42
x104 {4,9,14,23,24,37,53,71,86,90,103,104} 90
x105 {1,31,46,49,52,59,61,64,89,99,103} 79
1 + x106 {27,31,33,52,54,59,60,80,83,92,108,111} 192
1 + x76 + x106 {1,15,20,24,25,35,57,58,73,80,95,106} 219
1 + x100 + x107 {9,12,16,24,25,26,31,38,40,68,74,84} 190
1 + x108 {18,21,27,43,51,62,69,77,88,89,98,103} 193
1 + x45 + x108 {9,11,13,16,42,44,58,67,68,78,94,109} 26
x109 {7,10,11,19,38,43,46,52,66,70,77,83} 215
x46 + x109 {12,17,19,23,43,50,69,78,83,90,104} 138
1 + x110 {4,8,17,24,29,44,56,65,76,85,103,110} 201
1 + x111 {9,11,13,16,42,44,58,67,68,78,94,109} 60
1 + x67 + x102 + x111 {9,11,13,16,42,44,58,67,68,78,94,109} 205
These maxterms were used in an attack which was successful in fully
recovering the secret. Since the largest maxterm we used was of degree 12
and all 112 secret bits were attacked (i.e. no brute force guessing was used),
the complexity of the attack is less than 219 hashing operations.
6.2.3 Analysis
When experimenting with our cube attack, we noticed that when we in-
creased the number of rounds in the reduced-round variant of Keccak we were
attacking the maximum degree of the maxterms found seemed to roughly
double for each round. An examination of the Keccak-f [b] round function
casts some light on this.
If one examines the functions which compose the round function, one will
see that all but one of them is linear in GF(2). θ and ι are linear sums. ρ and
pi perform copies within the state array which do not affect the degree of the
underlying polynomials; they just move the polynomials around within the
state. χ is the only nonlinear member of the round function due to the term
(a[x+ 1] + 1)a[x+ 2]. Presuming a[x+ 1] and a[x+ 2] contain polynomials of
the state that are of maximum degree, χ could at most double the degree of
the state’s corresponding polynomials. So one round of Keccak-f [b] can at
most double the degree of any polynomial it receives in its state. Therefore,
the maximum degree of the Keccak-f [b] output polynomials is 2nr where
nr is the number of rounds.
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This matches our empirical observations. Since the Keccak sponge func-
tion already contains a full hash output worth of data after absorbing the
message, the “squeeze” phase is never performed in an ordinary hash. (And
in fact, the reference implementation never calls the Squeeze function in the
process of hashing a message.) Since our message always fit in one message
block, Keccak only ran the Keccak-f [b] permutation on it once, and as such
we were almost directly interacting with the Keccak-f [b] permutation. So
when we increased the number of rounds in the reduced-round variant we
were attacking, the degree of the maxterms roughly doubled because the
maximum degree of the Keccak output polynomials had doubled. A similar
observation was made by the Keccak design team in [9, §5.9.3.2].
If the maximum degree of Keccak’s output polynomials is 2nr , then a
cube attack would only be practical against up to 7 rounds of 224 or 256 bit
Keccak. Since the official configuration of Keccak submitted to NIST has 18
rounds, this is well within the margin of safety.
6.2.4 Related work
Aumasson and Khovratovich released the first third-party written analy-
sis of Keccak in [6]. They applied a number of automated tools to the
Keccak-f [1600] permutation, attempting to solve the “constrained input
constrained output” problem and using cube testers4 to explore theKeccak-f [1600]
permutation’s algebraic properties. Their work does not include any kind of
partial pre-image attack, but instead focuses on making observations on Kec-
cak’s structure. We feel that their work and ours complement each other, and
we recommend their paper to anyone interested in pursuing further analysis
of Keccak.
We are not aware of any other written analysis of Keccak that has been
released at this time.
6.3 Preliminary Results for Other Hashes
Aside from ESSENCE and Keccak, we also made brief attempts at applying
cube attacks to other hash functions to see if there might be the potential
for an attack worth researching. The configuration was similar to what was
4See [5] for more information on cube testers.
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done with ESSENCE and Keccak: A simple partial pre-image attack against
the hash configured to be at a reduced strength.
Blake We were able to find cubes of size 4-10 on Blake reduced to 1 round.
Since Blake has 10 rounds in its official configuration, we did not consider
the discovery promising enough to pursue.
CubeHash Against CubeHash1/16-224 we found nothing. Since that is
only 1 round of 10 steps and the official CubeHash configuration is Cube-
Hash8/1, which has 8 rounds, we did not pursue the matter further.
Skein We found no cubes when attacking 8 round Skein, and the official
configuration has 72 rounds.
MCSSHA3 Our results for MCSSHA3 were peculiar. To begin, we at-
tacked only the initialization and update phases of MCSSHA3, leaving off
the finalization steps. We immediately found maxterms for any degree we
tested on (including degree 0), yet all their corresponding superpolys only
contained variables for bits 0, 1, and 2 of the secret. This was against full
round MCSSHA3, i.e. we did not weaken it in any way except for remov-
ing the finalization phase. We found these results rather puzzling and did
not pursue them at the time due to our more promising discoveries with
ESSENCE and Keccak.
This presents an opportunity for further research which may prove en-
lightening with regard to the algebraic structure of MCSSHA3.
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Chapter 7
Related Work
There are a few other examples of cube attacks being applied to hash func-
tions that deserve mention.
MD6 attacks The original discoverers of cube attacks have collaborated
with the MD6 design team to test the resilience of MD6 to cube attacks [31].
Thus far the results are “very preliminary and tentative,” but they have
determined that it appears cube attack techniques can be used to distinguish
MD6 from a random function at up to 15 rounds. There is the possibility
that there exists a cube attack which could recover the MD6 key in the same
number of rounds.
This should be considered by no means alarming since for the smallest
digest size NIST requires (224 bits), MD6 has 96 rounds.
Cube testers Jean-Philippe Aumasson in collaboration with Itai Dinur,
Willi Meier, and Adi Shamir devised a modification of cube attacks called
“cube testers” [5]. In essence, they can be used to test a function for the
feasibility of a cube attack or differentiate it from a random function. They
cannot however carry out the attack. Aumasson has applied this technique in
analysis of a number of SHA-3 candidates, including Shabal [4] and Keccak
[6].
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
Having now explained cube attacks and demonstrated their application to
hash functions, there are a few closing observations we would like to make.
8.1 Effectiveness of Pure Cube Attacks
As can be observed from our results, cube attacks aren’t powerful in all
cases. While we did give two examples of their successful use in reduced-
round attacks, there were even more hashes which they did nothing against.
A cube attack’s success depends on the cryptosystem under attack having
a low degree. However, today most cryptosystems are based on a design
that uses rounds. This tends to drive up degree and quickly make a cube
attack impractical, except in the rare cases where the rounds do very little
to increase the degree and there aren’t very many of them. Hash functions
tend to have a considerable number of rounds though, and this tends to limit
the usefulness of a pure cube attack to corner cases.
8.2 New Areas for Research
This should not be taken as a denouncement of cube attacks. They are a
fairly recent discovery and like any other discovery there is still much room
to enhance and improve them.
For the time being, one area that may be worth pursuing is hybrid at-
tacks involving cube attacks, as were briefly discussed earlier in this thesis.
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Researching ways to combine cube attacks with existing well understood at-
tacks in some kind of meet-in-the-middle fashion could lead to a new variety
of very powerful attacks.
In short, while pure cube attacks as we currently understand them may
not yet be cryptosystem killers, there is considerable potential for enhance-
ment both through studying the details of how cube attacks interact with
the internals of various cryptosystems as well as studying their use in hy-
brid attacks. So far they have already been used to show weaknesses in
hash functions and stream ciphers and new developments and improvements
in our understanding of them are already being made. Their future as a
cryptanalytical technique appears promising indeed.
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